

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 30 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

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Mr. R.K. NEHRU

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Miss L. de VINCENZI

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VUJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. M. LACHS Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU Mr. E. GLASER Mr. C. UNGUREANU Mr. I. IACOB
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. P. LIND Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD Mr. B. VEGESACK
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.A. ZORIN Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV Mr. I.M. PALENYKH
<u>United Arab Republic:</u>	Mr. A. OSMAN Mr. M. KISSEM
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. Peter THOMAS Sir Paul MASON Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-fourth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As India happens to be the first on the list of speakers for today, I should like, with your permission, to make a statement now on behalf of my delegation.

As I am speaking for the first time at the present session of the Conference, let me first say on behalf of my delegation how very grateful we are to all our colleagues for their warm and moving tributes to the memory of our late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. My delegation has already thanked them; but, as further tributes have been paid, I should like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation once again.

All the tributes from our colleagues have laid stress on our late Prime Minister's contribution to peace and disarmament. As we have a new Government now in India, perhaps our colleagues may wish to know its broad approach to some of these problems. In a recent address to the nation, our present Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, reaffirmed India's basic policies. Speaking on peace and disarmament, he said that this is the greatest problem which faces us today and that the supreme task of the United Nations, to which India gives its full support, is to ensure not only that war is outlawed but that it is also made impossible. While expressing his agreement with President Johnson's view that a world without war would be the most fitting memorial to Jawaharlal Nehru, our Prime Minister said:

"We pledge ourselves today, in co-operation with other peaceful nations, to continue to work for the realization of this ideal".

In conformity with that pledge, my delegation will continue to exert every effort to ensure the success of our Conference. We shall continue our close and friendly co-operation with all other delegations. Those are the instructions which we have received, and as I have returned to Geneva only recently, may I thank all my colleagues for the welcome which they have kindly extended to me? May I also add my voice to the welcome which has been extended to our distinguished co-Chairmen and to our new colleagues?

Our session started in the early part of this month, and, as many of our colleagues have observed, we are meeting in favourable conditions. The three agreements of last year and the fourth which was reached this year have helped to improve the international atmosphere. Although the agreements were reached

(The Chairman, India)

outside the Conference, they are closely related to our work. We regard it as one of our basic tasks to keep this improvement alive and to strengthen it still further.

In the Conference itself we have made a good beginning by adopting for the first time a businesslike agenda (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 5, 6). Our leading colleagues have also assured us that on some of the matters which we are discussing their attitude will be more flexible. We naturally welcome this assurance, because, as our Soviet colleague Mr. Zorin has pointed out, a unilateral solution of the disarmament problem is impossible (ENDC/PV.188, p. 16). It will be easier to move towards a solution if greater flexibility is shown and there is a spirit of accommodation on both sides. Thus this assurance has created the hope that our new session may bring greater progress in our work.

We are today resuming our discussion of the question of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. The discussion which has already taken place has in our view been helpful. It has been marked in particular by what our United Kingdom colleague, Mr. Thomas, referred to on 9 June as an advance in the Soviet position (ibid., p. 21). Mr. Thomas has suggested, however, that, as serious difficulties still remain, we might move on to other items of the agenda. My delegation agrees that the other items are of great importance, and, if by mutual agreement they are given a higher priority in the present session, we too would agree. It does seem to us, however, that, as the Soviet position has shown a continued advance and greater flexibility has been promised, it is desirable to go on with our present discussion. This may help us to find ways of reducing some of the difficulties, even if for technical or political reasons an early agreement may not be easy.

It has been suggested by our Soviet colleague and other representatives of socialist countries that further discussion might take place on the basis of the Indian proposal. The advantage of having an agreed basis within the scope of the appropriate item of the agreed procedure of work is that it gives some direction to our thinking and discussion. With that end in view we put forward a proposal on 24 March for our colleagues' consideration (ENDC/PV.177, p. 28). Some clarification of the proposal was given later, on 28 April (ENDC/PV.187, p. 58). We feel that it might be helpful if, in the light of the discussions that have taken place, that proposal could be considered further.

(The Chairman, India)

Our broad approach to the question of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles is generally the same as that of our colleagues. We are all agreed that an area of agreement exists between the two sides and every effort should be made to widen it. Some widening has already taken place as a result of the changes in the Soviet Union's position. Those changes, we must recognize, have been made with a view to facilitating an agreement. A further widening of the area should be possible if greater flexibility and understanding are shown in our discussions. Our colleagues Sir Paul Mason (ENDC/PV.190, pp. 19 et seq.) Mr. Cavalletti (ibid., pp. 13 et seq.) and others have outlined the area of agreement. I shall not cover the same ground, but I should like to stress some of the points which seem important to us.

We are all agreed, in the first place, that the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles lies at the heart of the disarmament problem. There cannot be much progress in negotiating a treaty if there is no agreement on that question. We have been asked by the United Nations, (A/RES/1908(XVIII)), and the whole world expects us, to carry out the negotiations with a high sense of urgency. Unless some progress is made, the threat presented by countries which have rejected the very idea of disarmament will steadily increase. That threat has led countries such as ours which are wedded to disarmament to strengthen their defences. Thus we are involved in a vicious circle, which is a particularly painful one for the developing countries. Their burden has increased, as they have to meet threats to their security and at the same time carry out their development plans. The only way out is to intensify our effort to reach an agreement on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Our negotiations will then move forward, and we may soon be in a better position to consider the important question of how to make the treaty applicable to all countries.

Another point on which we are all agreed is that total elimination should not take place in the first or second stage but should be reserved for the third stage. Our Western colleagues have suggested that stability and security depend on a balance of nuclear power between the two sides. They have suggested the maintenance of nuclear missile shields during the disarmament process. Whether a balance at the existing high level gives the right kind of security is a point which might be considered later. However, the Western suggestion for the maintenance of shields has been accepted by the Soviet side.

(The Chairman, India)

Thus we have another point on which there is agreement; and I might add that we too -- that is, countries such as India -- are interested in the question of security. In fact security is a world problem; it is not a problem which concerns the nuclear Powers only. As we pointed out on 24 March (ENDC/PV.177, p. 30), while we wish to eliminate the danger of nuclear war, we have also to bear in mind the important consideration that our efforts should not give wrong ideas to an adventurist Power, or encourage it to indulge in aggressive activities with its superior conventional forces.

There is a third point which is of particular importance. It relates to the actual level of balance of nuclear power needed to ensure genuine security. I am stating the position as we see it; and if our analysis is not correct we shall no doubt be corrected. While nuclear armaments seem to form an integral part of the mix of weapons and defence structures of the nuclear Powers, I am sure we will all agree that they fall into a special category. They have a special purpose and character which distinguish them from other types of armaments. For the first time in man's history a weapon has been created which cannot easily be used. In fact, if used at all, this must inevitably lead to mutual suicide and annihilation. We cannot imagine any international problem which exists at present or may arise in future to which such a solution can be applied.

Nevertheless the situation is such that the threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the threat may never be carried out, seems to operate as a deterrent. In that somewhat negative sense, the deterrent may have helped to preserve an uneasy peace. A more positive effect is that on both sides recognition of the danger has led to greater restraint. From the point of view of security, however, such value as a deterrent has seems to depend on its being kept at a reasonably low level. A level which is steadily expanding or is already higher than that sufficient for the purpose of deterrence involves grave dangers. Far from ensuring security, it is, as we see it, a threat to security and stability.

It seems that the level of what may be regarded as a true deterrent has already been greatly exceeded. This is confirmed by such facts as have been disclosed to the Committee and by various statements made by leaders of both

(The Chairman, India)

sides. I need not repeat those statements, which have often been quoted in our Committee. I will mention only the statement which the late President Kennedy made to the United Nations General Assembly three years ago. Our Bulgarian colleague, Mr. Lukanov, also referred to that statement the other day (ENDC/PV.192, p. 6). The late President said:

"Every man, woman and child lives [today] under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness."

(A/PV.1013, para.50)

The late President then went on to describe the existence of these weapons as a source, not of security, but of horror, discord and distrust.

That was the situation three years ago; and, as our colleague Mr. Foster has informed us, there has been an enormous increase in the United States inventory since then. A similar increase must have taken place in the Soviet inventory. Is it not right, therefore, to conclude that the accumulation of all these armaments on both sides has reached a level which is a threat to humanity? If it was a threat three years ago when the late President Kennedy spoke, it must be a greater threat now. The level has clearly passed the danger point and is very much above the minimum level needed for genuine security or for deterrence.

How, then, is the situation to be remedied? If we are living under a nuclear sword which can fall on us at any moment, can it be said that we have conditions of security? It seems that such security as a true deterrent may be expected to provide has been compromised by this expanding level. It is a matter of some satisfaction that both sides seem to recognize this growing danger. Our United States colleagues have suggested an immediate agreement for the stoppage of production of certain types of nuclear armaments. They have suggested as a measure of high priority a verified freeze of strategic vehicles and fissionable material for weapon use. Those suggestions are being considered separately, and I am not going to speak on them today. The only question which sometimes troubles us is that, if a high priority is considered essential for a stoppage of production of certain types of nuclear armaments, why should the same priority not be accorded to the reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments?

(The Chairman, India)

As far as reduction and elimination are concerned, it has been suggested that balance can be preserved only by applying uniform cuts to all types of armaments in the three stages of disarmament. As regards stoppage of production -- which might also affect balance if confined to certain sectors in which one side is weaker or stronger than the other --, a clear distinction has been made between various types of armaments. Stoppage of production is, of course, essential, and we hope that it will be brought about in a balanced way and on an agreed basis. However, this by itself will not eliminate the danger created by the level of existing stocks of nuclear armaments. Those stocks, as we have been repeatedly told, are sufficient to destroy all life on our planet. Therefore it seems to us that the inter-relationship of stoppage of production and reduction or elimination of nuclear stocks might be recognized. In both those fields, in our view, some sort of priority approach might help us in our search for a solution.

Those are some of the considerations which led us to make a proposal at the 177th meeting and to clarify it at the 187th meeting. (supra. p.6) Two possible methods have been suggested for reducing and eliminating the menace of nuclear armaments. I shall not go into the details of the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) and of the United States proposal (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3), which have often been discussed here. Our own proposal seeks some sort of middle road which might help to ensure an advance towards an agreed solution. The proposal is that the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides to a less dangerous level, or to a level needed solely for the purpose of deterrence, should have the same high priority as has been suggested for the stoppage of production of certain types of nuclear armaments. The reduced levels should be established as early as practicable and should be maintained throughout the disarmament process. All remaining stocks should be destroyed under effective international control.

That is what we mean by a "nuclear umbrella", or a minimum nuclear deterrent, which would give greater security by reducing other dangers. Under the shade of this "umbrella", or minimum nuclear deterrent, which would be established at the earliest practicable stage, other agreed disarmament measures would be carried out under effective international control. How, when, where and in what shape the "umbrella" would be set up are all matters of detail. The suggestion we have made is that all such matters should be considered by a working group. That was the suggestion of our

(The Chairman, India)

Western colleagues, and we have accepted their suggestion. The working group must, however, know what precisely we have in mind. It must have a clear directive, or clear terms of reference. Otherwise the course of discussion will follow the same general course as the discussion in the main Conference.

We are glad that our Soviet colleague and our colleagues from the other socialist countries have accepted the suggestion for a working group. That is a distinct gain, as we may need working groups for other purposes also. Our colleagues have, however, suggested that the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" should first be accepted. As we see it, this means in effect that the working group should have a clear directive to examine, on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), practical methods to reduce the existing level of stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides to a level needed solely for the purpose of deterrence, at the earliest practicable stage.

We presume that the representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are not insisting on any other conditions. Our own position has always been that all matters of detail should first be examined by the working group. We have not expressed any views on the details of the Gromyko proposal; nor have we agreed to the study by the experts being confined to the proposals of only one side. Both sides --- and indeed all delegations -- should have the right to make proposals on the basis of the terms of reference. As the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, has pointed out (ENDC/PV.192, p.17), even more radical plans than the Soviet plan may be proposed. Other plans proposed on the basis of the terms of reference may be less radical. Our Soviet colleague, Mr. Zorin, does not seem to disagree with that view. On 23 June he said:

"We think that the working group could examine such specific questions as the number, type and power of the intercontinental, anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the disarmament process; the manner of distribution of these missiles; the order of their destruction at the end of the third stage, and the method of control over them."

(ENDC/PV.192, p.25)

(The Chairman, India)

On no specific issue or matter of detail, including such matters as the method of reduction or whether equal or unequal numbers are to be retained by each nuclear side, bearing in mind geographical and other considerations, can a commitment be expected in advance. If we have understood Mr. Zorin correctly, no such commitment has been asked for on matters of detail.

We understand that the terms of reference of the working group have been discussed, or are being discussed, by the two co-Chairmen. We hope that their efforts will be successful. The composition of the proposed working group is also a matter of importance, although that might be considered later. So far as the terms of reference are concerned, a possible approach might be to direct the working group, under item 5 (b) of our agreed procedure of work (ENDC/52), to examine and to report on specific issues arising from any proposal which may be made by any participating member for the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) and as part of the disarmament process, with the aim --- and I should like to emphasize that this is the crux of the matter, as it gives a clear directive to the working group -- of ensuring that at the earliest practicable stage of the disarmament process the existing stocks of each nuclear side are reduced to the minimum level of a specific nuclear deterrent, or a "nuclear umbrella", which would be retained by each nuclear side for the purpose of ensuring security until the end of the disarmament process, all other stocks of each nuclear side being destroyed under effective international control. We are not committed to any specific formula. We have put forward our suggestion as a possible basis for further discussion.

Mr. PECHOTA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): During the last three weeks of our negotiations the demand has been voiced almost unanimously that the Committee should at last proceed to a concrete, business-like consideration of the problems confronting it. In our opinion, this demand is fully justified not only as regards collateral measures but, above all, as regards measures of general and complete disarmament. We consider that the general atmosphere in which our work is being carried on makes it possible to hope that such an approach could yield positive results. This hope is strengthened by the new initiatives and proposals on the part of the delegation of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Today, when we are considering problems of general and complete disarmament, I should like to say a few words concerning the Soviet proposal (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) to set up a working group which, on the basis of adoption of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella", would deal with the specific problems and details involved in the implementation of appropriate measures for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We think that this new proposal by the Soviet delegation creates a suitable basis for achieving substantial progress in the negotiations of the Committee on general and complete disarmament. We are convinced of this both by the whole course of the preceding negotiations on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and by the favourable reception given to the Soviet proposal.

In our opinion, there have emerged possibilities of moving our negotiations forward. But, as we know, the possibilities depend in the last analysis on the will of all the partners around the conference table. We welcomed the fact when the representatives of the Western States also recognized that the Committee must move on, at last, to a concrete, business-like discussion.

But now, unfortunately, our Western colleagues are beginning to have reservations. They deny the need to have a definite, agreed plan of action as a basic prerequisite for business-like discussion of the problem in a working group. Our Western colleagues put forward various objections. On the one hand, they declare that their proposal also provides for the establishment of a sort of "nuclear umbrella". On the other hand, our Western colleagues try to raise a number of objections, from the allegation that the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" is insufficiently defined, to statements that this concept is unacceptable to their countries. In so doing they are clearly and persistently seeking to substitute for this equitable principle the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

As regards the substance of the various arguments advanced by our Western colleagues against the Soviet proposal to proceed to the consideration of the question of the elimination of delivery vehicles in an appropriate working body on the basis of adoption of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella", we cannot fail to note that these arguments are for the most part artificial and are not based on the true situation.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Very significant, for instance, is the comment made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, that the "nuclear umbrella" under the Soviet proposal requires the elimination of about 97 to 99 per cent of all nuclear delivery vehicles in eighteen months (ENDC/PV.190, p.47). The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, pointed out on 23 June that there is no foundation for such an assertion (ENDC/PV.192, p.25). Indeed, neither the delegation of the Soviet Union nor the delegations of the other socialist countries have ever adduced any such figures as would give our Western colleagues grounds for drawing such conclusions from the Soviet proposal. As Mr. Zorin emphasized in his statement at that meeting, the basis of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" is the retention of -

"... a minimum quantity of missiles with nuclear warheads which should be sufficient to deter any aggressor beforehand and would thus make it possible to eliminate all the remaining means of delivery in the earliest stage of disarmament." (ibid., p.24)

Equally unfounded, in our opinion, is the assertion put forward by some delegations of the Western countries that in proposing the adoption of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" as the basis for consideration of the problem in a working body, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries seek to ensure that the negotiations are conducted on the basis of the proposals of only one side. It is true that it was the Soviet Union that introduced into the negotiations on general and complete disarmament the idea of retaining a "nuclear umbrella"; and, in our opinion, this should be regarded as striking evidence of its efforts to find a mutually-acceptable basis for negotiations on the problems of the elimination of delivery vehicles. After all, this proposal has met with wide support throughout the world and, moreover, not only from public opinion but also from the governments of many countries. This has been shown in the work of this Committee as well as outside it, for instance at the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

There is no need to stress that the proposal for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" represents a substantial change in comparison with the original proposal of the Soviet Union for the total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage (ENDC/2). In adopting the concept of a "nuclear umbrella", the Soviet Government has gone a long way to meet the position of the Western Powers; it has shown the utmost flexibility and has again demonstrated its desire to reach a mutually-acceptable agreement.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

In contrast to this the delegations of the Western Powers have, during all this time, adhered to their original unacceptable proposal for a percentage reduction and have shown no willingness to take the slightest step towards reaching agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Now our Western colleagues picture the matter as though the Soviet Union were seeking to have only its own proposals considered. I think that the very history of our negotiations on the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles provides the best refutation of this allegation.

What position has the United States delegation, for example, adopted towards the Soviet proposal? In the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, on 16 June there was indeed an expression of agreement to the establishment of a technical working group to deal with the problem of delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.190, p.48). But as regards the basis for such discussions, Mr. Foster referred to the wording of item 5(b) of the agreed procedure of work (ENDC/52) that all proposals relevant to this agenda item be open for discussion in such a working group.

Such a position is obviously intended to create an impression of the flexibility and readiness of the United States to discuss any proposal in the working group. But we cannot help drawing the conclusion that this flexibility is only apparent. It was at the same meeting that Mr. Foster stated quite frankly that the United States could not agree to the Soviet proposal "either in principle or as the basis for negotiations." (ENDC/PV.190, p.47).

It is obvious that such a statement is not likely to increase the hopes which have been engendered by certain signs of an improved state of affairs in our negotiations. If there is no readiness to reach agreement on an equitable basis on which this working group would have to work, what prospects can there be for the work itself of such a group? Thus the sterile debates of our Committee would actually be transferred to a nominally-established working group. One can presume in advance that such a step would be a mere waste of time. Furthermore, the establishment of a working group under such conditions would give rise to baseless illusions in world public opinion. Even in the General Assembly the false impression would be created that the Committee had set about a business-like discussion of the problems relating to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles if the Committee's report were to state that an appropriate working group had been set up, whereas in fact the work of this group under the conditions in question could not lead to any positive results.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Altogether different prospects are opened up by the proposal of the delegation of the Soviet Union. Discussion of the problems relating to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on a basis of mutual compromise, which would be created as a result of adoption by our Committee of the principle of a "nuclear umbrella", would undoubtedly provide real possibilities for making progress. We believe to be fully justified the point of view that the establishment of a working group will make sense only if agreement is reached in regard to a definite common basis for the negotiations. Such a basis, of course, does not preclude the possibility that various problems and various opinions may arise in regard to the specific, practical solution of individual questions, but it would create favourable conditions for overcoming difficulties and finding mutually-acceptable decisions.

In the light of these facts, the question arises: why do the delegations of the Western countries continue to adopt an essentially negative position in regard to the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" and why do they cling to their unrealistic and unacceptable concept of a percentage reduction. Their representatives in our Committee try to justify this position by alleging that adoption of the proposal for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" would upset some sort of balance of forces, whereas a "percentage" reduction would maintain -- so they assert -- this balance throughout the process of general and complete disarmament.

But what is the truth? What have the representatives of the Western Powers in mind when they speak about maintaining a balance of forces? What balance is concerned? Recently the delegations of the Western Powers have often referred to a "rough balance of deterrence". One can judge from some of their statements that by this "rough balance" they mean the possibility for the two sides to deal a devastating blow at each other.

But in this connexion it is appropriate to point out a certain fact of some interest. Whereas the representatives of the Western Powers in their statements here in the Committee speak of a "rough balance of deterrence", on other occasions representatives of the same countries often state that they have a "manifold superiority" over the Soviet Union in strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons. We do not know -- in this case it is not really so important -- on what they base these arguments about a "manifold superiority". The only important thing is that these two, at first sight incompatible, ideas are expressed in the proposal for a percentage reduction of the numbers of delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

It is significant that even those who bandy arguments based on a "manifold superiority" are forced to admit that the Soviet Union has sufficient means for dealing a devastating retaliatory blow at a possible aggressor and that this fact will not in the least be altered by a further intensification of the arms race. It is enough to recall the words of the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, who declared, when speaking in the Sub- ommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate in connexion with the military budget of the United States for 1964:

"It would become increasingly difficult, regardless of the form of the attack, to destroy a sufficiently large proportion of the Soviet's strategic nuclear forces to preclude major damage to the United States, regardless of how large or what kind of strategic forces we build. Even if we were to double and triple our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all or almost all of the

hardened intercontinental ballastic missile sites." (Hearings before the Sub-
committee of the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, 88th Congress, 1st session, p.41

In our opinion all these factors throw new light on the proposal for a percentage reduction of delivery vehicles. The question arises as to what would be the consequences of the proposal; would it lead to the maintenance of a "rough balance of deterrence", or, rather, to a change in the correlation of forces in another direction, more favourable to the West? If --- as it seems to us --- the United States position is based on the assumption of its "manifold superiority", which is, however, incapable of destroying or weakening the effectiveness of the Soviet Union's means of retaliation, an attempt could be made to achieve the same goal in another way. If a new advance in armaments does not lead to this goal an attempt could be made to achieve it by means of a reduction of armaments carried out in a certain way.

That is, roughly, the train of thought which, in our opinion, is taking shape in the mind of certain military representatives of the United States. Of course, we have no intention of juggling with the designs of anyone, but we cannot avoid the impression that the proposal for a percentage reduction, which is clearly based on the aforementioned assessment of the situation, is motivated by precisely such considerations.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Therefore we consider fully justified the question raised on 16 June by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin:

".... one cannot help wondering whether some people in the United States, trusting in their 'manifold superiority' in regard to the number of intercontinental missiles and bombers, are counting upon changing the situation during the disarmament process in such a way that at some particular moment the United States would still retain the capacity to deal a powerful nuclear blow while the other side

would already have been deprived of that capacity." (ENDC/PV.190, pp.30-31)

In our view these circumstances confirm once again the sound basis of the position of the socialist countries that a percentage reduction does not provide the least guarantee for the maintenance of any balance.

On the contrary, it is obvious that equal conditions of security for all States, including the great Powers, can be ensured only if the prospect of reciprocal destruction is averted, and such a measure would have to be carried out simultaneously by the two sides. The most suitable and direct way to this objective would be the total elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, as was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1962 (ENDC/2). But, taking into account the objections of the Western Powers to such a solution, the socialist countries are prepared to accept the retention of a "nuclear umbrella". In our opinion this proposal opens up a practicable path to the solution of the question of delivery vehicles.

Last Tuesday the Czechoslovak delegation listened to the interesting statement made by our Nigerian colleague, Mr. Obi; and in this connexion it would like to stress his realistic approach to the question under discussion when he said:

"We feel, and strongly too, that the problem of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery not only deserves priority but belongs to a special category. It is for this reason that we express satisfaction at moves aimed at bridging the gap in the positions of the two sides. It is for this reason that we warmly welcomed both in the United Nations General Assembly and in this Committee, and shall continue to welcome, the two Gromyko proposals. It is for this reason that we hail Mr. Zorin's elaboration of an idea tentatively proffered by Mr. Tsarapkin during the previous session for an appropriate

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

working organ to consider the various issues pertaining to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, provided that the Committee approved the latest Gromyko proposal." (ENDC/PV.192, p.17)

We listened with great attention to the statement made today by the representative of India, Mr. R.K. Nehru. We listened with particular satisfaction to his pledge that the new Government of Prime Minister Shastri will steadfastly continue the active work for the realization of agreement on general and complete disarmament and in other fields important for the maintenance of peace and security. We also noted with satisfaction the way in which Mr. Nehru put forward his ideas on the question which we are now discussing, the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and the question of establishing an appropriate working body. Of course, we shall study with due attention all his extremely interesting ideas and we shall return to them when this question is discussed at a subsequent meeting. We think that the constructive approach of our Indian colleague will greatly contribute to the progress of our work.

The Czechoslovak delegation regards as correct the proposal that the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" should be the basis for the negotiations of a working group, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Only on this condition is the establishment of a working group likely to fulfil its purpose and lead to the achievement of positive results.

In concluding my statement, I should like on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation to express the hope that the delegations of the Western Powers will reconsider their attitude in regard to the Soviet proposal and thus help to ensure that the possibilities which this proposal opens up for achieving progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament are utilized to the full and with the least possible delay.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): By agreement we resume today our consideration of items 5 (b) and (c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52). Today and at our last two Tuesday meetings the Committee has focused much of its attention on the suggestion made by Mr. Zorin on 9 June that an expert working group should

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

now be set up to consider in detail specific questions about the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). This morning I should like to offer some brief comments in the light of what has so far been said on that particular matter.

Let me say at once that I warmly support the view that on certain key issues, such as the one now under consideration, the time has come when the Committee should turn from general discussions and get down to a detailed technical examination and assessment of the many complicated factors involved. That is a view which we in the United Kingdom delegation have long held and expressed. We have persistently urged the Committee to adopt that procedure on specific problems, because we strongly believe that it offers one of the best ways of making progress in our work. Therefore we are most encouraged by the fact that, at least as regards one particular problem, this view now seems to be shared not only by our Soviet and East European colleagues but also by other members of the Committee. That being so, we now have an opportunity which we should not fail to grasp. I can assure you that the United Kingdom delegation will do all it can to ensure that this opportunity is not lost.

I am sure we all agree that a working group on the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles will have to be established on some agreed basis if its work is to prove fruitful and constructive. As Mr. Zorin said in his statement at our meeting last Tuesday --

"In order to move forward in the work of the Committee it is essential to establish a working group which would operate on an agreed basis."

(ENDC/PV.192, p.23)

However, we have not yet agreed on what that basis should be. Our Soviet and United States colleagues have both indicated to the Committee what, in their view, that basis might be. In this connexion I noted that our Nigerian colleague, Mr. Obi, also made some suggestions in an interesting and thoughtful statement at our meeting of 23 June (ibid., pp.18, 19). This morning, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, we have heard an important, helpful and constructive statement from you as leader of the Indian delegation. Of course we shall all wish to study your

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

remarks carefully in the verbatim record, but I should like to say now that I find myself in agreement with much of what you have said. I have no doubt that other representatives also have views which they may wish to put forward at an appropriate moment and which the Committee will wish to consider.

The present position, therefore, can be described as fluid and open to negotiation. Provided maximum goodwill is forthcoming, I have every reason to hope it will be possible soon to agree on the basis on which a working group can be established. As Sir Paul Mason suggested two weeks ago (ENDC/PV.190, pp.19 et seq.), the position between the two sides is not really so far apart. In our view, a basis for a working group can be said already to exist. I shall not detain the Committee by repeating all the points made by Sir Paul on that occasion; but I should like to recall the fact, as you yourself pointed out this morning, Mr. Chairman, that there are already many areas of common ground between the positions of both sides.

In our view, on any objective analysis these points of agreement are more than enough to justify us in now turning to discussion of their detailed application. Therefore I was slightly disappointed, though certainly not disheartened, by certain remarks by our Soviet colleague last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.192, pp.20 et seq.) which suggested that these areas of agreement which already exist were, in his view, not enough. I realize, of course, that Mr. Zorin is anxious to arouse support for the view of his delegation and of his Government on how to reduce and eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles from the arsenals of States by the end of stage III of a disarmament treaty; but I am sure he would be the first to agree that opinions can vary on how this might best be done. I am sure that Mr. Zorin would also agree that, pending a thorough and detailed analysis by an expert working group, it is somewhat premature for any of us to claim that this or that proposal will necessarily provide us with the right answer, with an answer we can all accept.

That being so, it seems only sensible that if we in this Committee are to produce the right answer to the whole problem of nuclear delivery vehicles -- and, let us make no mistake about it, this Committee will simply have to produce the right answer sooner or later -- we should not prejudice the task of the working

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

group in helping us to produce that answer by attaching unduly restrictive conditions to its establishment and to its work thereafter. To my mind, that would be both unnecessary and even self-defeating. Indeed, it might even prevent the Committee from reaching agreement on the basis on which the working group should be set up in the first instance. If this were to happen, I am sure we should all deplore our failure to seize what may be a potentially significant opportunity to make real progress in this Committee on one fundamental aspect of our work.

Therefore it seems important to me that, in considering the basis on which the working group should be set up, we should try to steer a steady course between two extremes, a course which you, Mr. Chairman, described this morning as being "the middle road". On the one hand, the working group should not be on such a narrow basis that its detailed technical analysis fails to produce helpful results. On the other hand, the working group should not be on such a wide basis that its discussions become so diffuse as to be meaningless.

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, the suggestions put forward by our United States colleague, Mr. Foster, on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190, p.48) would provide us with one way of steering between the two hazards I have just mentioned. Those suggestions would enable the working group, among other things, to examine in detail and in depth the proposals put forward by our Soviet colleagues. At the same time, the working group would not be precluded from examining other proposals in this specific field with precisely the same objective: that is, the objective of reducing and eliminating all nuclear delivery vehicles from the military establishments of States by the end of the disarmament process.

The Committee will have noted that Mr. Foster did not make it a condition that before a working group could be set up our Soviet colleague should accept in principle the proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles in the Western disarmament plan. Mr. Foster's approach seemed to us a reasonable one. It would provide the working group with a sufficient degree of freedom in discussion, without which its work is unlikely to be productive. For the same reason, we in the West should not be required to accept in principle as a precondition for the working group the Soviet proposals, or for that matter any other proposals, in this particular field.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

I am sure that this was the thought which Mr. Obi had in mind last Tuesday when he urged the need for a forum giving scope for flexibility of approach, and when he said:

"It could well be that after ... discussions [in such a forum] a solution would emerge confirming the soundness of one plan or the other, or, even more likely and appropriately, a realistic compromise solution." (ENDC/PV.192, p.19)

It seems clear, too, that that was also the thought which you had in mind this morning, Mr. Chairman, when you said that the terms of reference of a working group should not be confined to the proposals of only one side (supra, p.11). As you said, both sides and, indeed, all members of the Committee should have the right to make proposals on the basis of the terms of reference.

Some of the remarks that were made this morning by the leader of the Czechoslovak delegation led me at the beginning to hope that his delegation too might be thinking along those lines, although I must admit that he did seem to retrace his footsteps at the end of his statement this morning. I hope, therefore, that our Soviet colleague will remember that, as both Mr. Foster and Sir Paul Mason pointed out on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190, pp.47-48; 19-20), both sides are now agreed in principle that they should retain agreed numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles throughout the disarmament process, that those numbers should be lower than those which would be in their possession when the disarmament process began, and that those retained missiles would constitute what could be called a "nuclear umbrella" to deter aggression throughout the disarmament process.

I realize, of course, that there are differences of view about the size, the shape and other characteristics of this "nuclear umbrella" at different stages of the disarmament process. But surely these, as Mr. Zorin himself suggested at our meeting last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.192, p.25), are matters which should be considered by the working group and on which we should reserve judgement until the group has carried out a detailed technical analysis.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Although it may be slightly irregular for me to make this comment, I cannot fail to take note that the eminent former leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, has come into the Council Chamber -- to make sure, I presume, that we are doing all the things he would like us to do. I am sure we all wish to extend a warm welcome to him on his return to Geneva in another capacity.

Your statement this morning, Mr. Chairman, appears to us to be a most constructive effort to help find a basis for a detailed study of the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles, without prejudice, may I say, to either side. As my own remarks today will indicate, we are in agreement with a number of points which you have made. For example, we agree that the principle of balance set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) constitutes a basic consideration to be applied to any proposal for the reduction of armaments. We also agree that a working group should consider all the proposals relating to item 5 (b) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52). I must, however, at the same time point out some views contained in your statement which we do not share. For example, we do not consider that the present levels of nuclear vehicles possessed by the United States are in excess of what we need under the present circumstances (supra, pp. 8-9). We shall, of course, wish to study the verbatim record in detail and shall probably offer more specific comments later.

It is a hopeful sign that we are now considering the formation of the first working group of this Committee. It is a hopeful sign also that all members of the Committee who have addressed themselves to this subject have called for the creation of such a group. As the representative of the United Kingdom has indicated, he and his colleagues have been consistent in presenting this suggestion over a considerable period. Our task here, therefore, is to find a mutually-acceptable basis on which such a group can be created. The United States delegation believes that such a basis can be found. My remarks this morning are intended to help find such a basis, and find it promptly, so that we may soon get down to a business-like discussion of this major problem.

At our meeting of 23 June the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, made two basic points which could help to crystallize our thinking about a working group.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

First, he said that there should be no radical disruption of the balance which appears to exist at the moment (ENDC/FV.192, p.16). This is a vital point contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and one with which I hope we are all in accord. The balance which we must preserve covers both nuclear and conventional weapons. A working group would have to keep that in mind. As Mr. Obi pointed out, the links which other components of military power have with nuclear weapons must always be considered.

Secondly, he suggested -- as you have, Mr. Chairman -- that nuclear delivery vehicles deserve priority in our considerations and that they represent a special category (ibid., p.17). This is also a point which we support. Indeed, we spoke on 16 June in favour of a working group to consider the subject of nuclear vehicles (ENDC/PV.190. p.48). Moreover, we have proposed that the disarmament process begin with a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120).

The representative of Nigeria then went on to point out that he could approve the substance of the most recent Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). He said he could do so provided -- and this is an essential proviso -- that the present balance of power would not be dangerously upset during the process of disarmament. That proviso is, of course, a key to the evaluation of the impact of the Gromyko proposal. It is impossible to determine whether the proposal would upset balance, without a reasonably definite notion of the amount of the cut in nuclear vehicles it would require in the first stage. We believe that balance is one of the most important factors the working group should consider. An agreement in principle to the Gromyko proposal would prejudge that consideration because it would imply that the proposal would maintain balance. That conclusion can be drawn only by experts with all the requisite information in their possession.

An expert working group is thus an appropriate forum for consideration of the concrete details concerning the elimination of nuclear vehicles, including the Gromyko proposal. Indeed, we would not object if the answers to the questions which many delegations have asked about the Gromyko plan were the first matters submitted to it. However, we should, of course, expect that the working group would consider any proposal, including the United States plan for balanced, stage-by-stage reductions (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Another interesting intervention at our meeting of 23 June was that of our Soviet colleague. I believe that some of his remarks could be helpful. I was glad, for example, to note that he set the record straight on one aspect of the Gromyko plan. He told us (ENDC/PV.192, p.25) that 97 per cent or 99 per cent reductions of nuclear vehicles were not contemplated in the first stage of the Soviet proposal. That statement was supplemented this morning by the remarks of the representative of Czechoslovakia. Over the last session we made it clear that, if that was the proposal which the Soviet Union had in mind, it could not be acceptable, for it would destroy the present balance. Of course, we should like to know more about the magnitude of the reductions which the Soviet Union does have in mind. A working group would seem to be a very good place in which to receive and evaluate that sort of information.

While we are grateful that Mr. Zorin corrected our misapprehension with respect to this matter, he did nothing to dispel our concern that the Gromyko plan would involve substantial reductions in the first stage --

"... without inspection for hidden vehicles and without improvement in the methods for keeping the peace" (ENDC/PV.190, p.47),

as I said on 16 June. If we are in error on these points, we should appreciate very much being so advised.

The representative of the Soviet Union also discussed the question of missile reduction under the United States proposals. He stated that, if general disarmament were delayed for a period of time, under the United States plan States might have more delivery vehicles at the end of the first stage than they have now. What the Soviet representative overlooked was that the United States suggested an immediate, verified freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles. This measure would put a lid on the expansion in numbers of vehicles to which the Soviet representative made reference. For just this reason, we hope that the Soviet Union will consider this measure seriously as we move ahead.

Let us now turn to the Soviet representative's statements on the working group. We believe we have opened the door, a little way at least, to the possibility of an acceptable basis for a working group.

He urged (ENDC/PV.192, p.26) that we now proceed to a detailed discussion of practical issues in a working group. We agree.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

He talked about the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles from national arsenals at the end of the disarmament process. Concurrently he expressed the idea that some delivery vehicles would be retained throughout the disarmament process. We agree with both those steps.

Now let us look for a moment at the main point where we differ. The Soviet representative insists that the Gromyko proposal be accepted as the basis for negotiations and that it be the sole proposal considered by the working group. We, on the other hand, do not insist on our proposal as the only basis for negotiations. Nor do we insist on selecting it as the only plan to put before the working group. We believe that the working group should consider any reasonable proposal within, and any relevant consideration to, the nuclear delivery item on the agreed plan of work (ENDC/52, p.2, item 5 (b)). The Soviet position is clearly unreasonable. No delegation should claim a monopoly of wisdom. No plan need be regarded as perfect.

Except for that point of difference, a basis for establishing the working group, which we all desire, is in sight. Both sides agree that the working group should concentrate its efforts on nuclear vehicles. Both agree that such vehicles be eliminated from national arsenals at the end of the third stage. Now that the Gromyko plan has been extended to the third stage, both agree that the disarmament process should take place under the protection of a nuclear deterrent composed of agreed levels of vehicles on both sides. That is all that is meant by the phrase "nuclear umbrella". Finally both sides have agreed that throughout the entire reduction process the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) should apply.

We strongly believe that these points of agreement are sufficient to form the basis for the establishment of an expert working group on nuclear vehicles. We believe its formation now could help our work to move ahead promptly in a business-like fashion.

Lij Mikael IMRU (Ethiopia): I have listened with the greatest interest to your statement this morning, Mr. Chairman, and to those made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States. I am happy to see that interest in the formation of a working group is now being generated and strengthened.

I am also happy to see the former leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, among us. It is good to know that he still retains an interest in disarmament in spite of his extensive duties in other fields.

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

My intention in requesting the floor this morning is to express the support of the delegation of Ethiopia for the proposals already made by several delegations for the establishment of a working group to consider fully the concept of a minimum nuclear deterrent during the process of disarmament. We are happy to observe that this concept now enjoys a wide measure of acceptance in the Committee, and we hope that a closer examination in a business-like working group will yield further results. In this matter the positions of both sides are becoming closer, and we feel it is high time to pass from general to more detailed consideration of the proposals -- from debate to negotiations in a working group.

The delegation of Ethiopia would like to express its appreciation to the Soviet Union for the accommodating spirit it has shown in the latest modification of its proposals. However, it is difficult and indeed uncomfortable to witness the spectacle of the thirsty horse, after being led to the watering-place, now being refused a generous drink. That is the significance of the controversy regarding the basis upon which the working group should be constituted. We know that the working group is going to discuss, in all its aspects and implications, the concept of the minimum nuclear deterrent. The principal object of the working group should be to examine and appraise all proposals, explore the areas of agreement, and devise a realistic and practical measure acceptable to both sides. If that is the objective, we cannot afford to restrict too narrowly the terms of reference of the working group.

The delegation of Ethiopia strongly urges the co-Chairmen to come to agreement on the particulars of the terms of reference. If agreement is not forthcoming, item 5 (b) of the agenda could of course be referred to the working group as it stands, as suggested by you this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great attention to the statements made this morning by the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as to the statement just made by the representative of Ethiopia.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

They dealt with a number of general subjects of our discussion, such as the question of how we should pass on to a more concrete examination of the central problem -- the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Some delegations have stressed the need to examine this question from a definite point of view, with a definite aim: namely the speediest possible elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, while providing for the retention of a minimum number of delivery vehicles necessary for maintaining the security of both sides.

The whole of the discussion this morning shows that there appears to be a desire to find a solution to the question of the basis for the activities of a working group; although, as it seems to us, today's discussion has still not provided a satisfactory answer to this question. Such is our opinion. What is the reason for this?

It is because there have emerged somewhat different approaches to the question of the basis for the activities of this working group. Everyone recognizes the need for the establishment of such a group. Indeed, the representative of India, when speaking about this basis of work, emphasized that the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" is indeed a matter of a directive for the working group. With that I can entirely agree. It is perfectly true. Further on he said that it was necessary to examine the problems of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with the aim of ensuring at the earliest stage of disarmament the elimination of all delivery vehicles, while a minimum level of such delivery vehicles would be retained by each side until the end of disarmament. I made a note of this from the simultaneous interpretation; of course there may be some inaccuracies, but that is the meaning.

As I understand, the representative of India aims at providing such a basis for the activities of our working group as would preclude any possibility of a repetition of the general discussions as to what should be the purposes of our work, the main direction of our work, and at making the working group a body in which it would be possible to examine really concrete problems relating to the establishment of this minimum deterrent, as some call it here, or what we call a "nuclear umbrella",

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

and to preclude any attempt to evade the solution of this problem by examining plans which essentially rule out the main objective -- the speediest possible elimination of delivery vehicles while providing for the retention of a minimum number of such delivery vehicles as an "umbrella".

I think that a search in this direction undoubtedly deserves attention, although the formula mentioned by Mr. Nehru seems at first sight to be still insufficiently worked out. But, obviously, we shall have to study the text of his statement, and we shall do so. I think that other representatives will do likewise.

The United Kingdom representative has also spoken at today's meeting. I am bound to say that he, too, appears to have made an attempt to approach in a slightly more concrete manner the question of the basis for the activities of the working group, and to have tried to find a basis for this work. In doing so, he put forward criteria which are of some interest and which show that on the one hand, as he said, the working group should not be restricted to technical matters alone, in order not to have too narrow a basis for the activities of this working group. On the other hand, its terms of reference should not be too wide, lest it be transformed into a replica of our Committee. This approach and these criteria are noteworthy because they make it possible to seek for such a basis for the activities of the working group as would provide an opportunity to deal in real earnest with a number of practical questions within the scope of an already-defined concept, so as not to go beyond the scope of that concept and not to transform the working group into a replica of our Committee. Only on this condition will there be any practical sense in establishing a working group.

However, in referring to the United States proposals, Mr. Thomas expounded his position in such a way that it was bound to give rise to very great doubts. He said, for instance, "We consider that the number of missiles to be retained should be lower than the existing level" -- that is how I jotted it down from the simultaneous interpretation. Is that a criterion for establishing a sound basis for our work in a working party? But here again the same question arises: how much lower? Is it a question of retaining a maximum or a minimum? When you say "lower", this clearly shows that it is a question of a maximum. It is some small reduction. That is how the meaning of your statement can be interpreted.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But if you wish the working group to be established on such a basis -- that is, on the basis that the number of missiles to be retained would merely be lower than the existing level -- I am sorry, but no agreement is possible on such a basis. On such a basis a working group would be paralysed from the outset. You see, here we have two different approaches: we propose the retention of a minimum number of missiles for the two sides or for two States, whereas you propose only a slight reduction of their number. These are two different approaches. Is it not obvious? I think this is clear to the United Kingdom representative as well.

But I note that the United Kingdom representative is unwilling today to make his position more precise and to say more clearly what sort of number it would be -- more than half or less than half. He is unwilling to speak about this today. Why? Because, as I see it, he is seeking to get us to agree to go into a working group without knowing clearly what our partners want. We will not go into such working group without knowing beforehand what our partners want. After all, we tell you clearly what we want. Then give us an answer: are you for this or against? Then it will be clear whether we shall have a basis for discussion or not.

We already know your position on the whole, and we tell you that it is unacceptable to us. If you stick to the position of a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as proposed by the United States, we tell you in advance that we do not agree to it. On that basis there would be no agreement between us in a working group.

What you tell us in regard to our position is not altogether clear. In his statement this morning, Mr. Foster pointed out that we had somewhat facilitated the position of the United States delegation when we said that we did not at all contemplate the retention of only 3 per cent or 1 per cent of all the delivery vehicles now possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. But he did not fully explain his attitude towards our proposal that the principle itself of a minimum should be taken as the basis. Today Mr. Thomas limited himself to the formula that the number of missiles to be retained should be lower than the existing level. That formula does not satisfy us. It does not give us a clear picture of the position you take, of the basis on which you wish to conduct negotiations in the working group.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Therefore, in order that we may really find a basis, you must state clearly your position in regard to the main question: do you agree that the whole question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be examined in the light of the principle that only a minimum, or rather a certain portion, of these vehicles should be retained for the purpose of ensuring your security and ours? If you are in agreement with this principle, then there is a basis for negotiations. But if this principle is lacking, if you do not accept this principle, we do not see on what basis it would be possible to arrive at an agreement in the working group.

I have another reason for dealing with this question in so much detail. It is because the United States representative, Mr. Foster, in giving some explanation of his position today, rather tried, I would say, to make out that "the Soviet Union insists that the Gromyko proposal be accepted as the sole proposal. We the United States, on the other hand, do not suggest that our proposal be taken as the only one." In saying this Mr. Foster implied that the position of the Soviet Union is inflexible whereas that of the United States is flexible. That, at least, is how I understood these statements of the United States representative.

In the first place I must say, however, that the Gromyko proposal is only a proposal of principle. In fact it does not contain any figures, nor does it give any concrete formulation of what is meant by a "nuclear umbrella" in terms of its specific characteristics. Consequently this proposal can only be regarded as a principle. But the proposal which you have submitted is an absolutely concrete proposal - it contains not only the principle of a percentage reduction, but also the figures for this percentage reduction. You say quite clearly: 30 per cent in the first stage, 35 per cent in the second stage, and the rest in the third stage. Here there are different approaches. Consequently there is a great difference in determining what can be taken as the basis for the activities of the working group.

If we took your proposal as the basis, the negotiations in the working group would be reduced to the reaching of agreement on very small problems, because in that case we would have accepted not only your principle of a percentage reduction but also a concrete application of this principle. It is obvious that such a proposal cannot be accepted. And you say quite sensibly that you do not insist on this proposal as the sole basis for negotiations. But it is unsuitable to us not only as the sole proposal but also as a starting point. It is unsuitable to us because, as we have already shown, we cannot accept the principle of a percentage

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

reduction for reasons that concern the maintenance of balance at all stages of disarmament.

You yourselves say that you agree that this balance must be maintained. But today you have not told us anything about how you refute the arguments which we have put forward at the last two meetings. We have put arguments and data before you; we have taken your data and shown that already at the end of the first stage of disarmament you would gain, under your proposal, an advantage over the Soviet Union. In that case, what becomes of the principle of balance? You have not given us any answer this morning; you have not refuted these data. It is quite obvious that the United States proposal cannot be one of the proposals to be taken as a starting point for discussion in the working group. It cannot be a starting point, because it infringes the basic principle which you and we have accepted - the principle of balance.

Further, you say that you are in favour of the United States proposal for a percentage reduction being considered, but that you are not in favour of your proposal being the only one, whereas the Soviet Union insists on the Gromyko proposal being the only one. No. That is incorrect. We do not all say that the Gromyko proposal should be the only one. We say that we wish the principle laid down in the Gromyko proposal to be taken as the basis of the activities of the working group. We are prepared to consider proposals which may be in accordance with this principle - any proposals, provided they are in accordance with this principle: the principle of the retention of a minimum deterrent in the initial stage of disarmament.

If you agree to this, we are prepared to consider any proposal of yours. Do submit any proposal that is in accordance with this principle, but not a proposal that would infringe this principle and lay down a different one - a principle which infringes the balance between the two sides. That is where we differ. The essence of the Gromyko proposal is that it lays down a definite principle for the solution of the problem: a minimum deterrent, or so-called minimum "nuclear umbrella", would be retained and all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be eliminated in the shortest possible time in the first stage of disarmament. What this "umbrella" should be, its characteristics, its expression in terms of quantity, the phases of its elimination, its control and so on are matters we are prepared to discuss.

But we have not yet a single formal proposal in regard to which we would say:

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

"Here is a proposal. Take it or leave it." We do not say that. Let us discuss in a working group what the minimum deterrent would be. If it is a question of the minimum deterrent according to Mr. Thomas's formula, there will be nothing doing, because that is not a "minimum" deterrent, but rather a "maximum".

As you see, there is still a great divergence in regard to the very approach to the question of what is to be the basis of the activities of the working group. Nevertheless, I am not inclined to regard all the theses that have been advanced here as wholly negative. I think that we should continue the exchange of opinions both at official and informal meetings, and try to find a formula which could become a basis for the terms of reference and activities of the working group.

I asked for the floor today solely in order to demonstrate to our Western colleagues and to the whole Committee that we are not at all insisting on our proposal out of capriciousness. If you put forward reasonable proposals that comply with the principle of a minimum deterrent, we are prepared to consider them. But to work to no purpose in a working group when there is no real basis of principle, we consider to be wrong. It would be a sheer waste of time and, where public opinion is concerned, it would create the illusion that something is being done, when we already know beforehand that nothing concrete can come out of the discussion because we have different approaches.

What I am anxious for is that we should arrive at a single approach. We are striving to find this single approach, and I see in the statements of the representatives of Italy and Ethiopia definite efforts to find it. I do not think they have yet found what is necessary. But they are seeking, it seems to me, in the right direction, and I think that we ought to join in this search. I would earnestly request the representative of the United States, the representative of the United Kingdom and our other colleagues to think over everything that has been said in the statements made this morning and to understand that what we want is not sterile work but work founded on the adoption of definite positions of principle, on the basis of which it would be possible to arrive at a concrete technical solution of a whole number of problems that arise in connexion with the adoption of the principle which we have put forward.

That is what I wished to say today. I think it would be useful to make the most of all the possibilities of our contacts, including the contacts of the co-Chairmen, to which the representative of Ethiopia referred today. We must all

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

try to reflect during the coming week, and if there are any additional considerations they will have to be considered; and I think that we shall have to continue the discussion of this question next Tuesday. Perhaps we shall find a positive solution to this important question so as to set about a more concrete examination on an accepted definite basis. Without this basis we consider the establishment of a working group to be useless.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I will not comment in detail on my Soviet colleague's remarks, as I believe it desirable to await the translation of his statement. At times Mr. Zorin appeared to be in agreement with us, and at others he seemed in disagreement. However, I can agree with his recommendation that the co-Chairmen should pursue this subject at their future meetings during the remainder of this week in order, as he said, to attempt to make progress, and that we should have a further discussion of this important subject next Tuesday. According to my understanding of the simultaneous interpretation, he stated that the United States proposal was concrete and the Soviet Union's proposal was not, but that what was needed was a concrete proposal. Therefore I think I had better await the translation of his statement. I hope that on reading it I will find that we have made more progress than my first impression indicated.

The CHAIRMAN (India): Before we pass on to the consideration of our communiqué, I should like to say a word about one of our former colleagues who is visiting us today. Not having had the privilege of meeting Mr. Godber, I was not aware of his presence in the "Distinguished Visitors' Gallery"; but now that my attention has been drawn to his presence let me say, in my capacity as representative of India and also as Chairman of today's meeting, that we are happy to see him here and happy to know that he continues to take a deep interest in our work, to which he himself in the past made such a valuable contribution.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 194th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador R.K. Nehru, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 2 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.